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Governance of new product development and perceptions of 
responsible innovation in the financial sector:  insights from an 
ethnographic case study 
We describe an ethnographic study within a global asset management company 
aimed at understanding the process and governance of new product development 
and perceptions of responsible innovation. We observed innovation to be 
incremental, with a clearly - structured stage gating model of governance 
involving numerous internal and external actors that was framed by regulation 
and co-ordinated by a small product development team. Responsible innovation 
was framed largely in terms of considering client needs when innovating and the 
understanding of operational, legal, regulatory and reputational risks. Staff 
perceived the company as having an inherently cautious culture, where the 
probability of bringing something destructive to market was perceived as being 
low. We conclude that the observed stage gating architecture offers considerable 
scope as a mechanism for systematic embedding of more broadly framed, 
emerging concepts of responsible innovation. 
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In this paper we investigate the process and governance of financial innovation and 
perceptions of responsible innovation in a global asset management company. This 
research sits within a broader goal to understand how theoretical concepts of 
responsible innovation emerging in science and technology studies and beyond (e.g., 
Owen et al, 2013; von Schomberg, 2013) might be framed and implemented in financial 
settings. To date there has been only little consideration of responsible innovation in 
finance (Armstrong et al, 2012; Muniesa and Lenglet, 2013) and almost no primary 
research.  
While the academic literature suggests some possible features of contemporary 
financial innovation, there have in fact been few documented accounts of either the 
process or governance of financial innovation in commercial organisations (Frame and 
White, 2004). We therefore elected to take a case study approach to our research. The 
paper is laid out as follows: We first briefly review the literature on financial innovation 
and its governance. We go on to describe in detail the process and governance of 
financial innovation in a global asset management company undertaking significant new 
product development. We then describe perceptions of responsible innovation in the 
company before finally discussing how established innovation governance approaches 
in this and other commercial organisations might be enlarged to embed a more broadly - 
framed responsible innovation approach. 
1.1. Financial Innovation and New Product Development 
Innovation in finance has a long history, at least as far back as 3000 BCE with the 
introduction in Mesopotamia of commodity money, early forms of banking, personal 
loans, interest and contingency claims (Allen and Gale, 1994; Goetzmann and 
Rouwenhorst, 2005; Allen and Yago, 2010). MacKenzie (2006) argues that financial 
innovation is a socio-technical phenomenon that has been shaped by modern economic 
theories of finance. Many authors (Llewellyn 1992; White 1997; Tufano 2003; Mishra 
2008; Sánchez 2010; Delimatsis 2011; Gubler 2011; and Lerner and Tufano 2011) 
suggest it involves both the creation and popularization of new financial products, 
processes, markets and institutions. Innovation of financial products and services 
continues to play an important function in society to support (amongst other things) the 
provision of a medium for exchange, the funding of economic enterprise, the transfer of 
resources, the management of risk, the coordination of distributed decisions and the 
resolution of problems of asymmetric information (Merton, 1995; Muniesa and Lenglet, 
2013). Financial innovation has long been a catalyst for economic, social and political 
change. For example, innovation of complex, structured, credit risk-shifting instruments 
such as asset-backed securities – collateralised debt obligations (ABS-CDOs) since the 
early 1990's proved important in catalysing a transition from old to new banking models 
(Llewellyn, 2009).  
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 brought into sharp relief not only the 
functions of financial innovations for society and their benefits in terms of the 
efficiency of financial systems, but also their potential to co-produce complex, systemic 
risks and shocks that de-stabilise those systems. In analysing the liquidity crisis of 2007 
- 2008 and its origins in the US subprime mortgage market, Llewellyn (2009) points to 
the key role played by opaque and complex financial innovations such as ABS-CDO’s 
in destabilising the global economy when combined with globalisation, incentivisation 
and other factors. Others have highlighted the social and political consequences of 
innovations such as cross currency swaps, which played a role in the hiding of 
sovereign debt (Dunbar and Martinuzzi, 2012), and the inability of stakeholders to 
manage the complexities that financial products like derivatives present, partly due to 
the idea of collective acceptance in which such financial products are valuable not 
because of their individual properties but because a group of people accept their status 
as a representation of value (Nightingale and Spears, 2010).  
The potential for financial innovation to impact economies and society at 
transnational and intergenerational scales reflects what Hans Jonas described as the 
technologically-mediated ‘altered nature of human action’ in late modernity (Jonas, 
1984). It has re-invigorated interest in how innovation occurs in the financial sector, 
how it is governed at varying scales and by whom, how potential impacts associated 
with innovation might be better anticipated and, where necessary, managed in a timely 
way – i.e., how financial innovation can be responsibly governed (Armstrong et al., 
2012).  
There has been surprisingly little empirical research on the process and 
governance of financial innovation. Frame and White (2004) identify some empirical 
studies published prior to 2002, but most of these focused on aspects of the ‘back-end’ 
of the innovation process like diffusion, the characteristics of adopters, and the impact 
of innovation on firm profitability, with little published empirical research aimed at 
understanding how innovations arise and why. As with other forms of innovation, 
financial innovation is a process that can be managed (Tidd et al., 2005; Tidd and 
Bessant, 2009), using approaches that are well established in the new product 
development literature and beyond (e.g., stage gating; see Cooper, 1990).  However, 
there have been few documented accounts of such strategic innovation management 
approaches in the financial sector. In total, the contemporary financial innovation 
process and its governance remain poorly characterised.  
The academic literature and other secondary sources of information (e.g., 
Llewellyn, 1992; Allen and Gale, 1994; Tufano, 2003; Vermeulen, 2004)) suggest 
several features of contemporary financial innovation:  a) It is often an incremental and 
recombinant process (Llewellyn, 1992; Allen and Gale, 1994; Lerner and Tufano, 
2011), but one associated with rapid diffusivity in the market place upon launch of new 
products or processes (Llewellyn, 1992); b) The lead time for innovation is often short: 
Drew (1995) and Beard and Dougan (2004) suggest an average lead time of just 12 
months, potentially presenting an extreme case of the dilemma of control (Collingridge, 
1980; see below); c) Innovation is generally an informal process, with little evidence of 
common, or systematically used governance frameworks (Sundbo, 1997; Armstrong  et 
al., 2012; Muniesa and Lenglet, 2013); d) It can involve multiple stakeholders, 
including financial and non-financial firms, governments, markets and exchanges and 
technology-related companies (Allen and Gale, 1994; Duffie and Rahi, 1995; Merton, 
1995; Ferguson, 2008): there is little documented understanding of how they operate 
and interact. The extent to which these features are generalisable – noting that 
innovation occurs across quite different financial sectors that range from asset 
management to insurance – also remains little explored from an empirical perspective.   
1.2. Governance of financial innovation 
There is no formal definition of governance in the context of financial innovation. More 
broadly, governance is a multi-level concept that varies in use and application (Rhodes, 
1996; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; and Rhodes, 2007). There is common understanding 
that authority, invested in an individual(s) or an institution, is necessary (Kooiman, 
1993; Stoker, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Lynn et al., 2000). We can consider 
governance of financial innovation as relating to the processes and mechanisms used by 
stakeholders to manage and oversee the creation, development and commercialisation of 
financial products and services, and the activities of appointed individuals and/or 
institutions charged with steering innovation activity in that sector (Stoker, 1998). 
Governance of financial innovation should not be confused with financial sector 
governance, which refers to the ‘framework of rules aimed at overseeing how financial 
institutions undertake and organise financial transactions within and across borders’ 
(Germain, 2010: 27). The concepts are linked, however, unlike governance of financial 
innovation, financial sector governance focuses on ensuring law and order in financial 
activity.  It does not specifically consider how innovations in the financial sector are 
governed from ideation to commercialisation. 
Although financial innovation has existed for many centuries, specific 
mechanisms for its governance outwardly appear to be lacking. However, as we will 
describe, contextual legislation that frames and has a bearing upon the innovation 
process may be both present and comprehensive, at least in the specific context we 
investigated. Such governance of the financial sector, in the form of legal frameworks 
and policies, dates back many years (Redfield, 1986; Levi, 1987; Gilligan, 1993; 
Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010).  These internal and external governing systems, 
focused as they are on financial activity, emphasize the regulation of the products of 
financial innovation after development and distribution, sometimes decades or even 
centuries after this has occurred. Governance of the financial sector rests on two 
approaches (Table 1) – statutory regulation and self-regulation (Stefanadis, 2003; 
Awrey, 2011). While statutory regulation is established, imposed and enforced by a 
higher authority – often an independent government agency, central bank or similar 
institution – self-regulation allows the sector itself to specify, administer and enforce 
policies (Bartle and Vass, 2005). Cox (2008) suggests self-regulation is preferred by 
financial institutions and regulators alike as an initial governance approach, and that the 
introduction or amendment of statutory regulation occurs when the former is perceived 
as having failed. Although both approaches involve the establishment of rules, 
requirements, standards and guidelines to govern the behaviour of financial institutions, 
they differ in terms of use and enforcement.  
Enforcement of statutory regulation is usually the responsibility of government, 
but this role is normally administered on its behalf by a central bank, or agency such as 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States, the European Securities 
and Markets Authority in the European Union, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
in the United Kingdom, or the Financial Services Agency in Japan (Crowe and Meade, 
2007; Donato et al., 2007; Stefano, 2010; Raptis, 2012). In contrast, policies established 
through self-regulation are administered and enforced by independent, self-regulatory 
organisations such as the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (Stefanadis, 2003), and / or through corporate governance 
frameworks comprising management, boards of directors, internal and external auditors 
and shareholders (Erturk et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008).  
In contrast with the financial sector, others sectors like chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals have clearly specified institutions accountable for external governance 
and oversight of innovation. These institutions enforce ‘data before market’ regulations, 
often underpinned by risk assessments. While such regulation has been suggested for 
new products across the financial sector (Crotty and Epstein, 2009; Mullineux, 2010; 
Allen, 2013), there are no plans to systematically introduce this (Pesendorfer, 2012), 
and any developments are likely to be slow (O'Riordan and Cameron, 1994).  
In 2006, China introduced policy guidelines on financial innovation for 
commercial banks (Loechel et al., 2010), emphasising the need for strong capitalization, 
sound corporate governance structures, good understanding of risks and prudent internal 
controls (Loechel et al., 2010). The EU has also recently established a Standing 
Committee on Financial Innovation (SCFI) under the European Banking Authority’s 
regulation (EBA, 2012), aimed at improving transparency, simplicity and fairness in 
financial markets. It monitors new and existing financial innovations and develops a 
coordinated approach to the regulatory and supervisory treatment of new or innovative 
financial activities, creating common methodologies to assess the effect of product 
characteristics and distribution processes on the financial positions of institutions (EBA, 
2012). The SCFI is expected to prepare a yearly report highlighting areas of concern 
with regard to consumer protection and financial innovation for use by the EBA and 
national supervisory authorities (EBA, 2012). It has identified key areas of concern in 
the industry – namely indebtedness and responsible lending, security and fraud issues - 
with regard to new banking and payment technologies and complex financial products 
(EBA, 2013a). This has led some National Competent Authorities within the EU to take 
actions including new risk labelling of complex products and a voluntary industry 
undertaking not to distribute certain complex products to retail investors in their 
jurisdictions (EBA, 2013a). Furthermore, the EBA and other supervisory agencies have 
actively begun to facilitate open discussions that include issues of consumer protection 
and financial innovation (e.g., an annual Consumer Protection Day; see EBA, 2013b).  
Discussions have included whether national regulatory agencies should have greater 
powers to intervene and impose restrictions on product features where necessary as part 
of the broader innovation process of product design, governance and distribution (EBA, 
2013b).  
There are few documented accounts of non - regulatory governance of financial 
innovation in commercial organisations.  Armstrong et al. (2012) and Muniesa and 
Lenglet (2013) recently suggested a role for New Product Development Committees 
within companies, but the extent to which such committees exist or are used is unclear. 
Within the literature, established mechanisms of corporate governance, oversight and 
monitoring (such as periodic audits and assessments, codes of conduct, internal 
controls, certification and rating schemes) do not appear to relate specifically to 
financial innovation, and systematic forms of monitoring do not appear to exist.  
In total, it appears that financial innovation falls into a governance void.  
However, this perception may reflect the paucity of published literature in the field, and 
in particular the lack of empirical studies undertaken in companies themselves. As such, 
the extent to which the situation is a governance void or information void remains 
unclear. 
1.3. The ‘dilemma of control’, anticipatory governance and responsible 
innovation 
In liberal market economies, expression of market choice directs goods and services 
resulting from innovation to their most desired end use (Lee and Petts, 2013). This 
approach has, however, failed – sometimes spectacularly – to prevent undesirable 
consequences associated with innovation. The financial sector, among others, has 
therefore been subject to the progressive introduction of post – hoc interventions in the 
form of regulation (see above). Market choice supported by retrospectively - applied 
regulation presents a well-known ‘dilemma of control’ (Collingridge, 1980). While 
understanding of the nature of risks and benefits of financial innovations may emerge 
from their use ‘in real world practice and on a large scale for a considerable period of 
time’ (Merton, 1995b), by the time sufficient knowledge has become available 
concerning the nature and risk(s) of the impacts of an innovation, such impacts may 
have already occurred. The innovation may also have become ‘locked in’, with limited 
ability for control (e.g. through regulation) without significant financial, social or other 
costs and/ or resistance from vested interests. Lock in and path dependency, sometimes 
fuelled by incentives and organisational culture, may serve to close down options to 
modulate, shape or control innovation (Stirling, 2008). Conversely, during the earlier 
stages of innovation there may be greater opportunity for modulation and control. 
However, at these stages there is far greater uncertainty concerning the nature and 
magnitude of potential impacts, and the evidence to make the case for control (or not) 
may be lacking. This dilemma forces a discussion concerning how to proceed under 
conditions in which adventure, precaution, risk, benefit, values, ambiguity, uncertainty, 
ignorance, contingency and the status of knowledge must all be carefully balanced.   
There is a rich literature, particularly in science and technology studies, aimed at 
understanding how science, technologies and innovation can be governed under such 
conditions. This includes concepts of de facto governance (Kearnes and Rip, 2009) – 
e.g., ‘boundary work’ through reports from learned institutions – and multi-level 
governance, including various forms of technology assessment (Schot and Rip, 1996; 
Guston and Sarewitz, 2002), anticipatory governance (Barben et al., 2008), ‘midstream 
modulation’ (Fisher et al., 2006) and responsible innovation (Armstrong et al., 2012; 
Owen et al., 2012; Muniesa and Lenglet, 2013; Owen et al., 2013; Stilgoe et al., 2013; 
von Schomberg, 2013). These concepts variously attempt to address the dilemma of 
control, while also seeking to enlarge the role responsibilities and accountabilities 
(Jasanoff, 2003) of scientists and innovators to include a broader moral and ethical 
dimension (Douglas, 2003; Mitcham, 2003), empowering a measure of social agency in 
technological choice (Stirling, 2008). Such approaches acknowledge ignorance and 
uncertainty as being inherent features of innovation that governance must take into 
account.  They emphasize as much the framing(s) and purposes of innovation, and the 
underlying motivations and values on which innovation is based, as the identification 
and where necessary management of risks associated with unanticipated or unintended 
impacts.  
We have built on such concepts to articulate a generic framework for 
responsible innovation (Owen et al., 2013; Stilgoe et al., 2013) based on integrated 
dimensions of anticipation, reflexivity and broadly configured, inclusive deliberation 
coupled to mechanisms of institutional responsiveness (see Box 1).  This approach 
offers one way of framing our empirical research concerning perceptions of responsible 
financial innovation.   
2. Methodological Approach 
2.1. Case study description 
We undertook the research at Fidelity Worldwide Investment, a large, privately- owned 
global asset management company founded in the 1960s. Its business is primarily 
involved in developing and managing assets (e.g., funds) and associated resources on 
behalf of clients.  Its roughly 5600 employees operate in 24 countries and manage more 
than $217 billion in assets. Targeting retail as well as institutional investors, the 
company offers platform services that facilitate savings, pension planning and 
investments for clients while upholding the company’s values of trust, entrepreneurial 
thinking, integrity and action. These values are embedded in the organisation’s culture 
and influence recruitment, training and remuneration.  
Fidelity’s substantive area of innovation occurs in fund development and 
trading. Briefly, the company develops or modifies funds, which are then traded as 
shares by its Investment Management (IM) team. In an iterative manner, trading 
information is then fed into an accounting system to record trades. Trades are 
subsequently priced by a Fund Accounting (FA) team, who aggregate prices for all 
trades associated with that fund daily to determine its overall value. This information is 
then passed on to an Operations (OPS) team, who calculate and confirm the number of 
shares that can subsequently be traded by the IM team the next day. They then carry out 
further trades based on the new price and information provided. 
The company adheres to policies that support compliance with anti-corruption 
and bribery laws and, through a Code of Ethics, policies on Giving and Receiving, Due 
Diligence, and Anti-Money Laundering.  These policies provide the foundation for a 
corporate governance framework for monitoring, reporting and escalation of 
compliance with relevant laws. The company is a signatory to the United Nations 
Principles for Responsible Investment; therefore, it considers Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) issues during the idea generation stage (see section 3.1 and 3.2.1 
below) of the innovation process. However, the company does not actively screen out 
companies from its investment portfolio purely on the grounds of poor ESG 
performance, choosing instead to adopt a positive engagement approach whereby these 
issues are discussed with the management of the companies in which it invests or 
considers investing in. Information gathered during these meetings is used both to 
inform investment decisions and also to encourage company management to improve 
policies and procedures. 
2.2. Ethnography 
Given the paucity of previous research, we chose a qualitative ethnographic approach 
that places emphasis on the identification of findings verifiable by observation 
(Thomas, 2003; Neyland, 2007; Eberle and Maeder, 2010; Brannan et al., 2012; 
Watson, 2012). Given the relatively rapid NPD process within the company, we adopted 
a ‘compressed time mode’ approach proposed by Jeffrey and Troman (2004) rather than 
the more traditional long-term approach to ethnographic research (Neyland, 2007). This 
approach ‘involves a short period of intense ethnographic research in which researchers 
inhabit a research site almost permanently for anything from a few days to a month’ 
(Jeffrey and Troman, 2004: 538). Our study took place over three months, with six 
weeks spent in-house and six weeks spent using teleconferencing and electronic media, 
during which period the company developed and launched a major new financial 
product (fund). The research took the form of non- participant observation within the 
organisation, with close access to actors and institutional processes as innovation 
occurred in real time. 
Specifically, observations, supported by detailed field notes, were undertaken 
within those company departments identified as being engaged in financial innovation 
and its governance. Understanding of organisational values and observation of 
behaviour and activities of employees was undertaken, including idea 
generation/brainstorming sessions, product development and decision making 
processes, and product/service launches. Field notes were organised in situ (Jeffrey and 
Troman, 2004) to contextualise observations in relation to previous observations and 
gaps in observational material (Neyland, 2007). Observational data were complemented 
by semi-structured interviews and a review of relevant documents supplied by the 
company (Neyland, 2007), with complete access being provided.  These included 
meeting agendas, minutes and organisational structure charts relating to the process and 
governance of financial innovation in the organisation. In-depth interviews, 30 to 45 
minutes in length and based on open-ended questions, were conducted with 18 senior 
and middle management employees in which interviewees were allowed to freely share 
their feelings, opinions and experiences (Milena et al., 2008) about the innovation 
process, its governance and perceptions of responsibilities / responsible innovation.  A 
seminar workshop was conducted at the company after analysis of the results in which 
staff from the Product Development team and other departments were asked to 
comment on the factual accuracy of the results in terms of the processes of innovation 
and its governance and to provide feedback on our interpretation and conclusions.  
3. Results 
3.1. The innovation environment: overview 
The company has four regionally-based Product Development (PD) teams – in the UK 
(where the researcher was based), continental Europe (Luxembourg), Asia (Hong Kong) 
and Japan. Each PD team comprises a small group – normally between three and seven 
people – who are responsible for overseeing products domiciled within their regions and 
who act as ‘gate keepers’ for products that are ‘passported’ in to their region for 
distribution purposes. PD team members include a Head (e.g., Head of Product 
Development, UK) and other employees with the job title (senior) Project Manager 
whose roles are similar, but are applied to different funds. Their roles are primarily one 
of coordination of activities, co-ordinating all stakeholders involved in various aspects 
of the innovation process to ensure a successful new product launch. Their daily 
activities include chairing and/or attending meetings, monitoring stakeholder activity 
related to the innovation process, and preparing all documentation pertaining to product 
development and launch. These innovation activities generally last between three and 
eighteen months after first level of approval to launch (Figure 1) depending on whether, 
for example, product testing is required. Decision making and authority is distributed 
equally among the heads of regionally-based PD groups.  Teams hold weekly telephone 
conferences to facilitate information sharing and to co-ordinate new launches.  New 
product development is thereby co-ordinated on a global scale.   
Innovation was generally of an incremental nature and confined to the product-
process innovation space (Tidd and Bessant, 2009), involving small changes to 
investment products (e.g., changes to investment objectives, risk levels, investment 
duration, target markets, etc.) and service offerings (e.g., changes to features of web-
based platforms). Although incremental, these changes accumulate to result in 
significant changes within the organisation and its offerings. Product innovations 
include the development and launch of new funds, while process innovations relate to 
improvements in how things are done and how customers interact with the company. 
These two types of innovation are carried out independently of each other, but they are 
linked as the development of new products must support existing service offering media 
and vice versa.  
We identified a loosely designed but structured approach to innovation (Figure 
1) with distinct phases of idea generation, product testing, business acceptance case 
development, product building, launch and post launch review. We now describe this 
process and its governance in detail. 
3.2. Innovation process and governance: detailed description (Figure 1) 
Since funds are legal entities in themselves, there is a need to properly manage them for 
success. A stage gating model of innovation governance was observed in which 
activities and progressive investment were phased from idea to launch, and punctuated 
by periodic approval points, or decision gates. These innovation activities and decision 
gates involved stakeholders from multiple departments within and beyond the UK, 
supported by members of the PD team who performed a cross departmental co-
ordinating role, and who interfaced with external actors (e.g., Financial Conduct 
Authority, FCA). 
3.2.1  Idea Generation 
In principle, generation of new product ideas in the organisation is open to all 
employees through the use of a central email address for idea collection and monitoring, 
although we noted that staff preferred a more informal approach based on personal 
interaction. For retail products, ideas were observed to be mainly client - driven, 
primarily via customer feedback. As the UK Head of PD stated, ‘customers need 
something different; hence the motivation for innovation is to satisfy customers’. 
Institutional investors were also noted to be involved directly or indirectly (through 
consultants/professional advisors) in the co-designing of products and defining of the 
product brief.  Research conducted on the market environment and global trends and 
competition within the industry were additional drivers of innovation. 
 Using informal setups, emerging ideas were observed to be analysed and 
refined by way of brainstorming, discussions and negotiations within and between 
departments in order to determine viability. Although members of the PD team are key 
stakeholders in the idea generation process, very few ideas actually originate there; 
instead, their participation extends to assessing ideas suggested by other departments 
and amending these during the overall process with the goals of feasibility and viability.  
In summary ideation was observed to be an organic, bottom - up process in which the 
PD team were observed to provide a co-ordination, assessment and stewardship role.  
3.2.2 Idea approval and testing  
Once ideas have been discussed and finalized, a pre-designed ‘term sheet’ is completed 
by the PD project manager for sign off by the Head of Product Development and 
submission to a Product Strategic Group (PSG) for approval.  This approval constitutes 
the first formal ‘decision gate’. PSG is made up of senior managers from various 
departments who meet monthly. Submissions are required to have a business and 
investment sponsor (i.e., a senior manager) who provides backing for the new product 
or project. The PSG reviews and approves the term sheet, assessing the fit to the 
strategic objectives of the company. It decides whether there is a requirement for further 
analysis and/or testing, or whether progression can occur directly to development of a 
Business Acceptance Case (BAC; see below). Decisions to test were observed to be 
based on four considerations – organisational capability, complexity of 
operationalization, financial return and customer demand. Testing normally occurs 
only for what are considered to be either a ‘new’ product, i.e., a product that the 
organisation has not launched before (subsequently referred to as product pilots), or a 
product that will be run by a new portfolio manager (subsequently referred to as 
capability pilots).  
The creation of a product pilot fund involves the use of company (rather than 
client) money. The timeframe from PSG approval to launch of the new product is 3-6 
months where there is no testing, and a further 6-12 months where testing is required. A 
product pilot that is found to be unsuccessful and /or not relevant to the market may be 
extended for purposes of training and systems testing, for up to ten years. The purpose 
of the testing phase is to check whether the product is viable, or to check the portfolio 
manager’s capability to run the fund. The pilot testing phase was therefore described by 
one staff member as: ‘an incubator for testing new product ideas, testing systems and 
developing people’. Other staff made an analogy to ‘early phase trials of 
pharmaceuticals’ prior to authorisation. Recently, the company has begun to engage 
with clients as part of the testing phase, involving them in assessing new product ideas 
and marketing messages aimed at determining the target audience and demand for 
products, whether the product proposition is understood, and whether clients understand 
the risks and benefits of the product. 
Success for the testing phase is based on the product meeting success criteria set 
for that particular pilot fund, which are articulated using a pilot success criteria template 
defined very early on in the testing phase. The criteria are reviewed periodically 
throughout the test phase at ‘pilot success criteria’ meetings, which review the overall 
experience of running and/or supporting a pilot fund and determine whether pilot funds 
should either be progressed to BAC approval with a view to being launched, be 
redefined, be recommended for continued testing, or be closed. Other formal meetings 
are also held to agree on dates and resources and consider operational issues such as 
content of the investment proposition and marketing considerations. The testing period 
is therefore an active period of institutional reflection and deliberation, the outcome of 
which is significant in terms of pursuing the original idea or not.   
3.2.3. Business Acceptance Case preparation and approval 
An important part of the innovation governance process is the preparation of a Business 
Acceptance Case (BAC), which must be submitted to a formal Product Review Group 
(PRG) for approval. This submission constitutes the second decision gate in the 
innovation process. 
Assembling this submission involves multiple departments, but the BAC itself is 
owned by the PD team who, using the term sheet described above, facilitate the 
information gathering process. The term sheet provides initial information later used by 
the assigned project manager within the PD team to initiate the BAC. Gaps in the 
template are filled through an informal but effective process of iterative email 
discussions involving various internal stakeholders (e.g., legal, investment compliance, 
investment management, portfolio manager, marketing and sales) immediately after 
approval to proceed, directly or indirectly via pilot testing, to the BAC level. All the 
stakeholders then sign off and the regional head of product development gives approval 
for submission to the PRG for consideration. It is important to note that information 
contained in the BAC is comprehensive, including: the drivers and motivations for a 
new product; how the product will be positioned in the market; the investment aim of 
the product (e.g., to provide long term capital growth) and how it intends to achieve 
that; the product’s proposed launch date; any risk considerations (including 
methodology used for measuring risk); regulatory considerations; and any operational 
aspects (such as the capacity of the company to manage the product) or financial 
considerations (e.g., asset growth and cost revenue analysis). A new product idea 
rejected at the PRG level may return to the BAC development stage for amendment and 
re-submission at a later date.  
The PRG meeting is a critical governance point in the innovation process. Its 
role extends beyond new product approval to encompass aspects of existing products, 
including review of fund pricing, seed capital usage, asset delivery and investment 
capacity. It is guided by a set of principles that includes the need to have an investment 
and distribution sponsor, a tangible cost/benefit analysis, three year sales estimates, 
relevant competitor analysis and due consideration of ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ (see 
below). Participants are normally senior managers from various aspects of the business, 
e.g., PD, legal and compliance, investment management, fund accounting, operations 
and marketing/distribution. Presentations to the PRG are made by the business and 
investment sponsors and focus on describing the new product proposal as well as 
explaining the rationale/motivation and the strategy put in place to ensure its successful 
build and launch. Each presentation is followed by intense discussion, challenging, 
clarification and questioning. 
 In one of such meeting, questions asked included: ‘How was the pilot done?’, 
‘What target is achievable in the projections stated in the business case?’ and ‘How did 
you determine the potential impacts of fee increases?’ The PRG, which was described 
by the head of PD, UK as ‘the gateway and control body when it comes to governance’, 
was acknowledged as a key location for thorough discussion and oversight. One of the 
members of this committee noted that ‘this forum occurs early in the innovation process 
and key decisions are made at a time when you do not know much about the new 
product; hence, how well the PRG works is partly dependent on who is on it and who is 
involved’.  
3.2.4.  Building of Product  
The product building phase of the innovation process is initiated after BAC approval 
and is a technical one involving several departments (e.g. FA, IM, OPS). It generally 
involves setting up the new fund as a legal entity, obtaining codes (both internal and 
external) and identifiers for the fund, and using this information to set it up on the 
necessary systems within and beyond the organisation. The process is initiated by a 
project manager in the PD team, who gains approval for seed capital for the fund and 
takes on a sense of ownership to facilitate continuity throughout the whole process, 
forming a project committee team after the new product has been approved by the PRG 
that consists of at least one representative from the departments involved in the build 
phase. This team will meet throughout the remainder of the innovation process until 
several weeks after product launch. Meetings are short and there is relatively little 
discussion. The agenda consists of brief task update reports and includes feedback on 
FCA filing and approval (see below), sign up with new providers, fund and account set 
ups, and challenges and their potential impact on timelines. One such meeting lasted for 
just 18 minutes, with participants providing short reports such as ‘everything is on 
target’, ‘account numbers are ready’, ‘all funds have been set up and dummy 
transactions loaded today’, and ‘FCA authorization has gone through today’. For larger 
products, a project steering committee may also be convened as an additional form of 
oversight to which the project committee team will report. Involving senior managers, 
this committee is a location for more detailed questioning and discussion of operational 
issues, risks, and their implications for the business and its customers.   
During the build stage, approval is sought from the fund’s custodian/trustee (i.e., 
the financial institution tasked with the responsibility of safeguarding a firm’s assets) 
and a detailed prospectus is prepared and submitted to the FCA for approval. Tax 
authorities (e.g., Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, HMRC) and external auditors 
also play a role in external governance, although their involvement is limited to specific 
product types (for HMRC) and occurs post product launch (for auditors). Via 
representation on the project committee team, the legal and compliance team is 
continuously involved in the building phase of the innovation process, explaining to the 
FCA which new products the company is planning to introduce, preparing all necessary 
legal documents for submission, and arranging contracts with external parties. Their 
participation at the end of the building phase includes ensuring compliance to marketing 
and/or distribution rules. Their role in monitoring compliance extends beyond the 
product building phase to the innovation process as a whole by way of identifying and 
considering possible risks and questioning whether new products treat customers fairly 
and deliver what customers want. This process includes PRG meetings in which the 
approval of a new product is contingent upon compliance with necessary regulatory 
requirements.  
3.2.5.  Final Board Approval 
The Board of Directors’ meeting serves as the third and final formal decision gate prior 
to launch of a new product. As with the PRG, decisions made by Directors are based on 
review and careful consideration of any issues mentioned in the BAC, which in turn 
builds on the initial term sheet. It serves as a double check and is often a quick and 
straightforward process with limited discussion and challenge since it is expected that 
by this stage any issues have been addressed. The Board meeting sometimes occurs 
very close to the product launch date, in some cases within several days.  
3.2.6.  Product Launch  
The launch phase makes new funds, new platforms/user interfaces and other product 
and process innovations available for use; it is not a specific launch event. The 
marketing team play a key role, contributing to the messaging and marketing 
proposition (with consideration of the intended outcome, investment approach and 
make-up of the product) and preparing question-and-answer hand-outs for the new 
product or process. These and other nested activities, including conversations with 
rating agencies, analyses of competitors, internal training and sales events, and 
advertising campaigns, begin weeks before the launch. Guided by a four-step process of 
‘awareness, conviction, purchase and review’, these activities aim to get new products 
and services to clients effectively.  
3.2.7.  Post Launch Review/ Benefits Realization 
Between six and twelve months after launch, a post launch review phase (for new 
products) or benefits realisation review (for process innovations) begins, involving an 
assessment of performance and fit with respect to the BAC. This assessment aims to 
ensure that funds are behaving in the way originally communicated to customers and 
that financial projections have been achieved. If a major issue is identified that could 
constitute a breach of what was promised to customers, it must be taken back to the 
various governing bodies (e.g., the PRG) for possible remedial action. 
3.3. Supporting tools 
We observed innovation to be supported by a document-based, checklist-orientated 
approach, reflecting the complex, multi-stakeholder nature of the innovation process 
and the multiple interdependencies that exist among various actors.  Examples in 
addition to the term sheet and BAC document described above include initiation of a 
‘RIAD’ register after PRG approval to (1) summarize risks (R) and issues (I) identified 
with regard to a new product/project and (2) monitor the progress made on these in 
terms of actions (A) and decisions (D), supported by a key decisions log summarizing 
key decisions taken on risk/issues identified. A fund launch checklist is used and 
updated during the build phase to guide the gathering of information concerning a new 
product and monitor progress of activities. A Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) log 
guides decision making very early on in the innovation process and is prepared and 
submitted as part of the BAC approval process (see below). The TCF is also updated 
during the build phase as new issues arise and is useful in influencing decision making 
at the Board level. Unlike other documents, the TCF log is relatively simple in that it 
attempts to answer just four questions:  Is the product/service designed to meet the 
needs of the target audience? Are the proposed fees fair, transparent and reasonable? 
Will the product deliver on what it says it will deliver? What are key risks of the 
product/service from an investor perspective? The PD product manager provides initial 
answers to these questions based on his/her subjective opinion and experience, after 
which answers are subjected to further review and sign off at PRG. More generally, the 
use of automated control systems with inbuilt rules is also a widespread feature in those 
departments carrying out the numerous technical activities that occur during the build 
phase of the innovation process, particularly those activities related to the control of 
pricing, which is set to automatically flag up or discard discrepancies outside predefined 
limits which must then be signed off. 
3.4 Risk Assessment and Management  
The characterisation and communication of investment risks to clients is a fiduciary 
responsibility of the organisation. Investment risk management falls under the IM 
department, which calculates all risk measures related to products across all asset 
classes and makes sure that communication processes with clients reflect these 
assessments. The likelihood of, and associated level of confidence in, certain investment 
outcomes occurring are estimated, using methods that include historical and normal 
distribution analysis, stress testing and educated guesses. The risk identification and 
assessment process normally commences with assessment of known risks for the type of 
products the organisation trades in (e.g., default risk, credit risk, market risk, etc.). Other 
risks that may be less obvious are also considered. The organisation believes that in 
most cases participants at PRG and other meetings have sufficient experience and a 
sufficient knowledge base to identify these broader risks without the need for a 
prescribed catalogue of questions; risk identification and assessment is thus experience- 
and expert–led. 
Identified risks are monitored over time by the investment risk management 
department using a process of ‘back testing’, in which emerging information is used to 
validate previous assessments and revise earlier models and processes. In situations 
where complexity, for example, renders the assessment of risk for a particular product 
difficult, the product launch will be delayed until the situation can be sufficiently 
resolved – implying a degree of precaution in the innovation process. Nevertheless, staff 
appeared to appreciate the limits to risk assessment, accepting that all investment risks 
cannot be understood and acknowledging that the financial industry as a whole is 
exposed to some risks, including systemic ones, that many still do not fully understand. 
In such cases the head of investment risk management explained that the organisation 
‘focuses on managing stakeholder expectations by creating awareness of the uncertainty 
that exists’, i.e., a strategy of openness and communication. 
In terms of operational risk, we observed a ‘three lines of defence’ approach, 
with the head of product development constituting the first line of defence and being 
directly responsible for assessing and managing all risks associated with new product 
initiatives. The legal and compliance team forms the second line of defence, challenging 
the assessments made from an independent position and ensuring that the head of 
product development is equipped with the necessary tools to effectively assess and 
manage risks on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. The third line of defence is an 
internal auditing function aimed at ensuring compliance.  While most members of the 
organisation believe that they can assess most risks from a position of experience and 
collective input, the value of potential loss or gain is used to prioritise time spent on 
managing identified risks. 
3.5. Regulation  
3.5.1. Contextual legislation 
Regulatory compliance was observed to be the responsibility of the compliance and 
oversight department, which also keeps abreast of changes in regulatory policies. 
Interviews with individuals from this department highlighted increasing regulatory 
coverage of the funds sector, evolving from a previous situation where ‘as long as you 
explained clearly what your fund was, everything was ok’ to one where ‘there is no 
such thing as an unregulated fund product in Europe’. Interviews suggested that the 
landscape had evolved from one of no regulation to the use of self-regulated fund 
associations such as the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), 
which, under the 1986 UK Financial Services Act, provided a stamp of approval in 
exchange for adherence to certain codes of conduct. Under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000, IMRO business was taken over by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and more recently the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), whose 
regulations financial companies have a legal obligation to comply with. 
The FCA implements broader EU Directives that serve as important legislative 
context for product development by setting the rules within which these products can 
operate once launched. These directives include: the Undertaking Collective Investment 
in Transfer of Securities (UCITS) Directive (introduced in 1985; revised 2001 and 
2009), under which the company operates; the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (introduced in 2007) focused on competition and consumer protection; and the 
Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (introduced in 2011), aimed mainly 
at private equity and hedge funds. The FCA’s directive on product governance and 
intervention also calls for financial institutions to act in accordance with set rules, with 
clear guidelines on when and how authorities should intervene. The FCA additionally 
provides its own Treating Customers Fairly charter relating to the usefulness of a 
product, its price, and understanding and communicating investor risk (see previous text 
and below).  
3.5.2. Regulatory approval 
In enacting these various directives, the FCA generally approves products via a 
prospectus submitted during the build phase (normally 4 to 6 weeks before launch).  
The FCA checks that the fund works and approves of its associated investment 
objectives. However, the FCA also reserves the right to arrange visits in order to review 
all documents and the innovation process as a whole. In one such visit, the FCA 
presented the organisation with 56 questions about a product launch, grouped under 
seven main headings: product governance; product strategy; target market; distribution 
strategy; risk and stress testing; price and value; and execution and review.  In its 
assessment, the FCA also considered those committees involved in product governance, 
their roles throughout the innovation process, and how issues and risks were assessed 
and escalated.  
3.6. Perceptions of and motivations for responsible innovation 
The interviews highlighted that although responsible financial innovation was an 
ambiguous concept, providing client satisfaction and meeting their needs was a 
generally-accepted definition, with all but four of the eighteen respondents making 
reference to this idea. Words such as ‘fairness’, ‘communication’, ‘deliver’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘solution’ were used to describe how a responsible financial 
organisation should behave towards its customers. Words such as ‘value’, ‘happy’, 
‘beneficial’ and ‘safety’ were used to portray how customer satisfaction could be 
measured.  One third of those interviewed highlighted a need to make sure that 
innovations not only met customer needs but were also commercially beneficial, to 
ensure the long-term survival of the organisation. Satisfying both organisational and 
customer needs through the creation of shared value – long-term, greater financial 
security for clients and long-term return/survival for company (Porter and Kramer, 
2011) – appears to have influenced perceptions of responsible innovation among a few 
interviewees. Other concepts of prudence, simplicity, flexibility and adaptability were 
mentioned by less than one-third of the respondents.  Although only one interviewee 
considered broader issues related to the unpredictability and complexity of the impacts 
of financial innovation, that respondent echoed others who suggested the need for a 
responsible organisation to ‘spell out risks and investigate its implications for market’, 
‘question how much of the complexities can be reasonably understood’, ‘identify how 
much of the innovation process they can control’ and ‘stress test products to ensure they 
are fully understood’.   
The depth and length of discussions, challenging, and questioning that preceded 
decision making at key meetings throughout the innovation process all suggest a degree 
of deliberation, anticipation and reflection, coupled to institutional responsiveness - key 
dimensions of responsible innovation proposed by Owen et al. (2013) and Stilgoe et al. 
(2013). The organisation’s practice of carrying out testing and using the results to 
support decisions on whether to proceed with an innovation or not also demonstrates 
iteration, adaptive learning and responsiveness. A recent move to involve retail clients 
(e.g. in idea testing) and established involvement of institutional clients (e.g. in co-
designing products) demonstrate a degree of inclusion and deliberation, with the 
potential for improving the capacity of the organisation to expand its field of view.  
In general, however, the framing of responsible innovation was largely limited 
to satisfying customers, regulatory compliance and the anticipating, understanding and 
management of corporate risks  – investment, operational, legal, regulatory and 
reputational (e.g. account/web setup delays, portfolio manager capabilities, trademark 
issues, etc.). In this frame, respondents equated financial innovation to continuous 
improvements in products and processes, with perceptions of a cautious culture of 
incremental innovation.  
All respondents agreed that responsible innovation requires both a high level of 
personal commitment and collective responsibility. However, staff largely perceived 
responsible innovation in the context of their roles within the company. For example, 
those in product development considered responsibilities in the context of their role to 
make sure that all new products are approved at all levels for timely delivery; whereas, 
those in investment were concerned about investment risk assessment, and those in 
oversight and marketing were interested in ensuring compliance and information 
disclosure. Senior managers stated that they had additional responsibility to challenge, 
question and contribute to decision making, as they sit on most of the governance–
related meetings. Such comments made by interviewees suggested that agency is an 
important dimension of responsible financial innovation, with respondents 
demonstrating agency by taking ownership for the things they do.  
Interviews suggested four main motivations to undertake responsible innovation: 
self-fulfilment, personal values, image, and financial rewards. Interviewees made such 
comments as: ‘I want to look at myself in the mirror and know that I have not let 
anyone down’; ‘I feel I can make a difference’; ‘The feeling that I work in an industry 
that is worthwhile makes me genuinely want to help’; ‘Knowing that what I did has 
contributed towards the wellbeing of someone else makes me want to do more’. These 
and many other expressions used by respondents revealed how the feeling of self-
fulfilment encourages them to act responsibly in what they do. Respondents 
demonstrated a desire to uphold personal and organisational values of integrity, trust 
and hard work. About one third of respondents believed that this desire to maintain 
values and be responsible is in their personal nature and ‘sits deeply down inside of 
them’. Additionally, the desire for some respondents to maintain a positive outlook on 
themselves and the organisation (especially in the eyes of external stakeholders such as 
clients and the FCA) seems to be a powerful motivation. Only a few people mentioned 
financial rewards, set within an institutional culture of long-term, performance–related 
remuneration, as a motivating factor for responsible behaviour. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
4.1. Financial innovation and governance 
Our review of the academic literature suggested financial innovation to be largely an 
incremental process, with significant automation and short lead times, and with little 
evidence of specific forms of governance, regulatory or otherwise. It is important not to 
generalise from the results of one case study. The extent to which our findings are 
generalisable both within and beyond the asset management sector requires further 
research.  Nevertheless, our observations confirmed within one large global asset 
management organisation a) the incremental and recombinant nature of financial 
innovation (in this case varying the characteristics of funds), b) a degree of automation 
and c) the relatively short lead time of the innovation process from ideation to launch.  
In contrast to the literature, we observed a well-structured and coordinated stage 
gating model of innovation governance involving multiple actors, with phased 
innovation activities punctuated by clearly-defined decision gates, and which included 
risk assessment and regulatory compliance. It was clearly defined on paper as a process 
that members of the company from various departments were required to follow and 
that involved obtaining approval at various levels. There were clear lines of 
accountability. It involved the completion of documents, prospectuses and checklists, 
and it included processes for monitoring, assessment, and evaluation. These processes 
and actors were mainly internal to the organisation, framed by its policies and code of 
ethics, and involved a measure of external client involvement. Innovation also was 
subject to external oversight and approval, in which external regulation and codes of 
conduct such at the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) Charter were important drivers 
that framed product development. FCA approval is in fact required for any financial 
product involving some form of trading on a regulated market and the TCF Charter 
relates to all forms of new product and process (FCA, 2013) within the financial sector. 
This finding contradicts assumptions that there are no specific forms of governance 
directed specifically at financial innovation, at least in the context of fund development 
studied here.  
Regulation was perceived by at least some members of staff, particularly those 
within the oversight and compliance team, as focusing on the stimulation of financial 
innovation, protecting investors, ensuring information disclosure, guiding how financial 
activities should take place and what actions national regulators should take against 
those who do not comply. Staff exhibited limited awareness of the existence of the 
Standing Committee on Financial Innovation (see Introduction).  
These results suggest the presence of an information void that could be 
addressed by more open and transparent articulation of internal and external innovation 
governance mechanisms to stakeholders and the public by the company and FCA.  
4.2. Perceptions of responsible innovation 
Armstrong et al. (2012) and Muniesa and Lenglet (2013) have argued that responsible 
innovation in finance can be considered from seven different perspectives, some of 
which were evident in the case study. The first of these perspectives on the function and  
broader, ethical perspective on the purpose of finance in society (e.g. considerations of 
‘making money with money, for whom and for what’ (Armstrong et al., 2012: 5)) – was 
not observed to be discussed. The perspective of accountability was clearly evident, for 
example, in situations where heads of departments had to sign off documents and make 
themselves available for questioning during governance proceedings. Furthermore, 
contextual legislation provided an innovation envelope within which the organisation 
had to work, aligned with a precautionary perspective on responsible innovation. 
Professional role responsibilities, underpinned by strong institutional and internal values 
were also an important framing. This aligns with the perspective on internal values 
described by Armstrong et al. (2012), Muniesa and Lenglet (2013) and Millo and 
Lacoste (2012). Values within the organisation included profitability, sustainability, 
meeting clients’ needs, and treating customers fairly in line with external guidelines. In 
terms of values of ethical investment (Mackenzie, 1998; Schwartz, 2003; McLachlan 
and Gardner, 2004; Hudson, 2005; Hofmann et al., 2009), the company was observed 
not to use screening criteria (negative/positive) based on ethical positions, choosing 
instead to place emphasis on openness, transparency and choice for investors (e.g., 
through its fund supermarket platform, where investors can access ethical funds, 
enabling customisation of their investment portfolios).   
Significantly, the framing of responsible innovation was strongly influenced by 
perceptions of an inherently cautious corporate culture, where the likelihood of bringing 
something harmful (for clients, society) to market was perceived as being unlikely. The 
perceived level of uncertainty of adverse impacts has recently been suggested as being 
an important influence on how responsible innovation is institutionally framed (Pandza 
and Ellwood, 2013). Low uncertainty of impact, they suggest, promotes ‘re-iterative 
agency’ in which there is routine, habitual and selective reactivation of past behaviour 
patterns that become institutionally stabilized and where issues of responsibility are 
perceived as being largely uncomplicated. In contrast, they suggest that high perceived 
uncertainty of impact may promote other forms of agency, notably projective agency, 
where there is ‘imaginative projection of possible future trajectories of actions’, and 
evaluative agency, where ‘judgements are made among alternative possibilities in 
response to emerging demands, dilemmas and ambiguities’, in the context of values, 
rights and duties. Such forms of agency may be of greater relevance in circumstances 
involving radical and disruptive innovation, but these conditions were not observed in 
our case study, where innovation was incremental and where the probability of adverse 
impact associated with innovation was perceived as being low.  
 Pandza and Ellwood (2013) have suggested that under conditions of projective 
and evaluative agency, two behaviours are mobilised: discursive competency and the 
development of new practices that are more accountable to wider society. Both of these 
we have witnessed in previous cases of ethically contested and highly uncertain techno-
visionary science such as geoengineering (Macnaghten and Owen, 2011; Stilgoe et al., 
2013). Dimensions of responsible innovation we have previously developed (Owen et 
al., 2012; Owen et al., 2013; Stilgoe et al., 2013) speak directly to such considerations, 
advocating in an integrated and iterative way anticipation, reflexivity and reflection e.g. 
on the purposes and motivations of innovation, and inclusive and  broad deliberation 
with stakeholders and publics. The framework we have developed integrates these 
dimensions and couples these to a fourth element, institutional responsiveness, such that 
the direction and trajectories of innovation are responsive.  
Some of these dimensions are not unfamiliar in corporate environments 
(Muniesa and Lacoste, 2012; Ferguson and Muniesa, 2012); it is how they are framed 
and their normative basis that is key (von Schomberg, 2013). In this regard, Muniesa 
and Lacoste (2012) suggest understandings of the issues at stake can be limited. The 
pilot testing phase for example was observed to be an active period of institutional 
reflection and deliberation, and its outcome had a significant impact on decision making 
i.e. responsiveness. The inclusion of multiple internal stakeholders and, to a degree, 
external clients, suggests a highly developed process of internal deliberation. However, 
such reflection and deliberation was rather narrowly framed and narrowly constituted, 
largely internal to the organisation and extending mostly to involvement of clients. This 
we believe reflects the low perceived uncertainty of adverse impact, the cautious and 
incremental innovation culture, and the strong institutional and internal values within 
the company which, as Pandza and Ellwood (2013) suggest, can stabilize and re-inforce 
professional role responsibilities and organisational capabilities through processes of re-
iterative agency.   
Armstrong et al. (2012) and Muniesa and Lenglet (2013) have suggested the use 
of New Product Committees (NPCs) could foster responsible financial innovation. We 
did not observe NPCs per se within the company. However, the use of committees such 
as PSG and PRG within a well-defined stage gating model of governance was 
prominent. This model, we suggest, could provide a more holistic governance approach 
within which emerging responsible innovation dimensions might be embedded 
(Macnaghten and Owen, 2011; Callon and Lacoste, 2012; Stilgoe et al., 2013; Pidgeon 
et al., 2013), broadening conventional inputs such as technical feasibility and market 
potential into the decision gates.  Arguably, the case for broadening existing stage gating 
governance approaches in this way might be stronger in instances of radical financial 
innovation, where the regulatory context for product development is less well-
established, ambiguous or absent. That said, the cumulative impacts of even incremental 
financial innovation in a complex, globalised and dynamic environment may be 
significant, suggesting that even in the context of incremental innovation framed by 
clear contextual legislation, such approaches might have considerable value. As such, 
we suggest that the embedding of emerging frameworks for responsible innovation 
within the types of established stage gating models observed in this case study offers an 
opportunity to promote responsible innovation of financial products and services that 
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Table 1. Governance of the financial sector (financial activity) and financial innovation 
compared. 
 Financial Sector Financial Innovation 
Processes / 
Instruments 
a) Statutory regulation 
(externally imposed rules, 
requirements, standards and 
guidelines for implementation). 
 
 b)Self-Regulation     
(collectively set rules, codes of 
conduct, standards and 
guidelines, which are voluntarily 
enforced and externally 
monitored by self-regulatory 
organization. 
None, although specific forms of 
regulation have recently been  / 
considered in the EU and China 
Actors / Institutions a)  Governments, via central 
banks and / or independent 
agencies and financial 
authorities. 
 
b) Corporate institutions via 
established governance 
frameworks   (e.g. Board of 
Directors, internal auditors, 
shareholders etc.) in association 
with independent, self-regulatory 
organisations (e.g. national 
associations; stock exchanges) 
 
Isolated accounts of New Product 
Committees (Armstrong et al, 2012) 
 
 
Mechanisms Monitoring (e.g. periodic audits 
and assessments, certification, 
ratings schemes 
 
Enforcement (e.g. legal 










Box 1. Dimensions of responsible innovation (adapted from Owen, Stilgoe et al. (2013) 























Responsible financial innovation entails an open, collective and continuous commitment 
to be: 
a) Anticipatory – describing and analysing possible intended and unintended 
impacts that might arise, be these economic, social or otherwise. Supported by 
methodologies that include those of foresight, technology assessment and scenario 
development, these not only serve to articulate promissory narratives of 
expectation but to explore other pathways to other impacts, prompting  innovators 
to  ask ‘what if…’ and ‘what else might it do?’ questions. Tempered by the need 
for plausibility, such methods do not aim to predict, but are useful as a space to 
surface issues and explore possible impacts and implications that may otherwise 
remain uncovered and little discussed. They serve as a useful entry point for 
reflection on the purposes, promises and possible impacts of innovation. (Guston, 
2013).   
 
b) Reflexive – reflecting on underlying purposes, motivations and potential 
impacts, how benefits might be distributed ,  what is known (including those areas 
of regulation, ethical review or other forms of governance that may exist ) and 
what is not known; associated uncertainties, risks, areas of ignorance, assumptions, 
questions and dilemmas. 
  
c) Deliberative – inclusively opening up visions, purposes, questions and 
dilemmas to broad, collective deliberation through processes of dialogue, 
engagement and debate, inviting and listening to wider perspectives from publics 
and diverse stakeholders. This allows the introduction of a broad range of 
perspectives to reframe issues and the identification of areas of potential 
contestation. Sykes and Macnaghten (2013) describe a number of specific methods 
that can be employed. 
 
 
d) Responsive – using this collective process of reflexivity to both set the 
direction and influence the subsequent trajectory and pace of innovation, through 
effective mechanisms of governance. This should be an iterative, inclusive and 
open process of adaptive learning, with dynamic capability.  
 
Figure 1. Financial innovation and its governance within Fidelity Worldwide 
Investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
